Almost everyone seems to agree that the last year has hardly brought a favorable  change in any aspect of the people’s lives, except of those who have been the direct beneficiaries of the 18 February elections. The latter include not only the members of the largest cabinet in the country’s history, but also those elected to the central and provincial legislatures and those hoping to get elected to the Senate in March, along with a large number of advisers and other officials appointed by the Presidency and the Executive.

 Of course, those who voted in the 18 February elections were neither promised nor hoped for a rose garden, but they did expect a slightly better prospect in the foreseeable future, if not for themselves but at least for their children and grandchildren.

 There was a promise in the first 100 days of the new democratic dispensation – fuelled more by hope than realism – that some of the basic deprivations of the poor and needy, such as food, employment, shelter and education and some of the more common aspirations of the broader citizenry, such as law and order, self-governance, price stability,  infrastructure development, transport, health and sanitation facilities, would be addressed in a more transparent and pro-active way than was done by the previous unrepresentative military-dominated regime of Gen. Musharraf, whose sole preoccupation was to continue in power through a divisive and corrosive political strategy.

 The hopes raised by a cohesive political alliance between the major political parties across the regional and ideological which could meet the economic and political challenges of the time and energize and bring together a divided and depressed nation were short-lived. The alliance, born more out of expediency than conviction and commitment to the common cause of national welfare, was subverted by a confluence of external and domestic factors, which connived once again to deprive the country of a chance to resurrect itself from the graveyard of failed states.

 Much blame-trading has gone since its virtual collapse after the exit of General Musharraf from the presidency, which was perhaps the only real common denominator binding the two principal protagonists of the failed alliance. It is futile to dwell on the merits of either’s case, since both seem to have hidden agendas, which are likely to unfold only in the coming months.

 The emerging scenario seems to consist of two equally disastrous options: a PPP-MQM-ML(Q) alliance, with possible jettisoning of Gilani as PM and his substitution by a Q-League nominee or a mid-term election with possible gains for PML(N) and a break-up of PPP. Both scenarios are likely to result in confrontational politics until Zardari’s term as President comes to an end and the opening up of the door for military intervention (whose shape may be quite different from the four preceding ones). Both scenarios are likely to be zero-sum games for the two protagonists and of no net benefits are likely to accrue to the poor and people at large.

 Which of the two possible scenarios or combinations thereof will actually be realized depends not only on the dynamics of the political alignments, but also on hard ground realities which have been manifesting themselves lately.

While patience is being advised by those who have assumed the reins of power, those who had voted to throw out the old order and usher in a new one, are disappointed to see many old faces, continuity of many failed policies, little change in ground realities and not enough recognizable change in the old ways of governance, except to make superficial waves. Some are beginning to share Shakespeare’s lament in Macbeth: “From that spring whence comfort seemed to come, discomfort swells.” People are impatient for the promised change. 

After  the euphoria about reconciliation in the wake of  unanimous elections of speakers, deputy speakers and leaders of the house at both the Centre and the Provinces, visible signs of fissures and attempts to de-rail the train of democracy appeared right from the day it steamed off the station. The forcible eviction of Justice Ramday from the judges’ colony was the first sign that the old-guards of the establishment were up to some mischief and wanted to provoke the lawyers to take  actions which would create rift between the two coalition partners. This attempt was firmly and promptly nipped-in-the-bud by the new Government’s Advisor in the Ministry of Interior, who was presciently installed to guard the tracks. The Arbab Rahim and Sher Afgan Niazi incidents took some time to engineer, but both eventually backfired, though not without causing initial damage to the reputation of both the PPP and the lawyers’ movement and considerable loss of life and limb in Karachi in their aftermath. Such  incidents are unlikely to stop until the present climate of political uncertainty disappears.  

In the meantime, the bread (which fewer can afford enough of) and butter (which only a few could ever afford) issues continue unabated, with the price of atta touching a new high (of Rs185-190 for 10 kg bag of wheat flour No. 2.5) and the petrol prices slated for a further upward revision and the load-shedding in some areas reaching almost half-a-day. The riots in Multan by powerloom workers who lost their livelihoods because of load-shedding,  could spread all over the country, especially as the summer sets in, if drastic measures are not undertaken to ensure a minimum of 18 hours of power supply and the burden of shortages is not more equitably shared. Mr. Ayaz Amir’s half-serious plea to the Prime Minister to use candle-light seems to have been taken with misplaced seriousness by burdening his hometown, rather than his workplace, with additional load-shedding. Much of the rioting appeared to be spontaneous and the result of Obamaesque  “bitterness” of economic exclusion; partly it could have been instigated by those who want to embarrass the new Government. The new leadership must, however, eschew the blame game and convince the protesters of their efforts to address these problems through their on-the-spot presence and intervention, rather than that of the police and their coercive weapons. In an open democratic society such protests are inevitable and must be squarely faced. 

For many who voted against the ancien regime, symbolism was as important as substance. The continuance in office of the retired-General-President, especially with the hubris and authority that is alien to his constitutional position, continues to rile those who have voted for the return of democracy. It is obvious that he is being suffered largely because of his perceived  support from  the US and the Army – although the latter has tried to lean over backwards to distance itself from politics. But his capacity to destroy the democratic process can’t be underestimated, given his past record, and he is likely to repeat it if pushed to the corner. The strategy of waiting to strike when the iron is hot or to marginalize his position in the power structure to the extent that he himself finds it pointless to continue, thus seems acceptable. 

Even if Musharraf can be considered sacrosanct for the sake of expediency, it is puzzling why the appurtenances of the failed regime that he headed and the flawed policies he pursued, should be left untouched. Besides the Provincial Governors, such high officials as the Attorney General, the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission, the Chairman of the HEC, the Secretary of the National Security Council, the Chairman of ERRA and the Chairman of the Food Security Committee, who were among the architects of the last regime’s flawed policies, remain firmly ensconced in their positions. It is difficult to see how the new leaders can hope to meet the aspirations of the people that voted for them without replacing these high officials to ensure a new, progressive, democratic, socially equitable and non-elitist Pakistan. 

A disturbing feature of the transition is that the policies inherited from the previous regime’s economic team, which was responsible for creating large imbalances in the economy and building a false euphoria, through fudged data, about growth and poverty reduction,  is  being retained by the present regime, under Mr. Ishaq Dar. What is even more disconcerting is that the Finance Minister has promised the “continuity” of economic policies at the recent IMF and World Bank meetings, instead of crafting new economic policies in keeping with the new mandates. There is a need for arriving at a new minimum economic program acceptable to all political parties. There is also a need for an institutionalised consultative process, such as establishing an Economic Advisory Board and reviving the Planning Commission, to prepare a new economic blueprint for the next five years to be presented to the Parliament for approval.

In particular, nobody wants to throw money to save the economy of a country which goes broke every few years and whose leaders come knocking at the doors of affluent “friends”, blaming the predecessor regime for having “emptied the treasury” and promising their most exemplary behaviour in the future (a story whose credibility is now zilch). The tragedy is that a country with the reputation of a habitual beggar, not only loses general sympathy for its problems, but also the “friends” who were willing to hand over a $500 million check to its acting finance minister a decade ago.

 Gen. (r) Musharraf, as well as his two military predecessor who ruled for almost the same period as him, had found a way of avoiding these frequent dole-seeking visits by striking  fortuitous arrangements with the one on whom the whole world depended in times of trouble (but which unfortunately now has fallen on as hard times as us) in return for services rendered as a loyal ally.

 The country is focused almost exclusively on how it would be able to service the $40 billion plus foreign debt, which is more than 10% higher than when Musharraf took over, than to put food on the floor (on which most people eat) of its poverty-stricken bottom 40 percent of the population. The primary concern of our economic managers seems to be on how to save Pakistan from the threat of default on its foreign loans, which must be paid by the year’s end. The amount being discussed is in the region of $3-4 billion of immediate payments, although the total financing gap for the balance of payments was projected at around $7 billion for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2009.

 The immediate requirement is less than 3% of Pakistan’s GDP and equivalent to the remittances Pakistan receives every year from its workers and professionals abroad. It is something which  the nation could easily adjust to if people had faith in their rulers and if they could be mobilized to make sacrifices equitably, even though the poor are already so heavily burdened that any additional sacrifice on their part can’t be suggested with any seriousness. Unfortunately, this is not likely to be the case because the elites are unwilling to give up their gains acquired during the Musharraf regime. What is more likely is that the current budgetary deficit of 7% GDP will be slashed to 4%, largely by curtailing the expenditures likely to benefit the poor – such as food and fuel subsidies and social expenditures – while those benefiting the rich will be maintained or even increased.

 The only thing being debated now is whether such a reduction in the budget deficit will be made under the auspices of an IMF agreement, which would include other contractionary and restrictive provisions. The elected Government of Asif Ali Zardari is apprehensive of concluding any agreement with the IMF which would compromise his party’s populist image and would further aggravate the suffering of the poor and lead to even greater unrest on the streets. It seems that the IMF is willing to recognize this political difficulty and get Zardari on board for longer-term reforms by bailing the country out from the brink of the precipice it stands at now. For that the Government is hoping that “Friends of Pakistan” consortium meeting in Abu Dhabi next month will approve a larger package of, say $10 billion, for stabilizing the economy over the next two years (or seven quarters). For the very long term, Mr. Zardari has expressed the hope during his New York visit that Pakistan should receive a $ 100 billion aid package to sustain its long-run development. But that is a long-run for which Keynes was not very sanguine about. (Many will,  however, wonder at the arithmetic no-brainer that $10 billion is exactly 10% of $100 billion).

 Pakistan has been in this kind of situation several times in its brief history, the last time being the period after its nuclear testing in May 1998 when the US imposed sanctions on it. It ended up by freezing over $12 billion of Foreign Currency Accounts, much the same way the $12 billion of foreign exchange reserves have been put paid to as a result of a combination of political stability, economic mismanagement and deliberate efforts to ruin the economy. The country was on the verge of default in 1998 but the Nawaz Government succeeded in signing a $5.5 billion package with IMF and World Bank, out of which $3.5 billion were for debt restructuring and debt rescheduling its $32 billion foreign loans about a year before Gen. Musharraf succeeded in staging a coup against the civilian government of the day. Another IMF Standby Agreement was concluded after Gen. Musharraf took over, but after its conclusion the country was flush with foreign exchange earned from an average annual inflow of $1.5 billion as economic and military aid for joining the war on terror soon after 9 /11, 2001.

 It is now well-known that bail-outs create serious moral hazard problems, never succeed in reforming and rebuilding the debtor economy. What is even more troubling is that bail-outs result in rescuing those economic actors who are the primary cause of the default or who have most benefited from the foreign loans, which the country is unable to service. The rest of the nation, especially the poor, who have played no part in foreign borrowing or have benefited, are being denied the attention they deserve from their elected representatives in the solution of their pressing economic problems, which have steadily escalated to unprecedented levels since the beginning of this year. If the IMF-sponsored agreements are signed, notwithstanding the usual assurances about safety-nets, they are likely to bring much more misery to them.  

 The scare being created about the consequences of a default is highly exaggerated and is really intended to letting the nose of the foreign camel in the tent. Many Latin American countries during the 1980s debt crisis and since have survived after debt default and have come out none the worse for it. What Pakistan needs at this time is not a contraction of public expenditures, except non-development, but an expansion of employment-generating development and social protection expenditures, which are likely to be curtailed in the event of an IMF-supervised package.

 A recent IMF Working paper evaluates empirically four types of cost that may result from an international sovereign default: reputational costs, international trade exclusion costs, costs to the domestic economy through the financial system, and political costs to the authorities. It finds that the economic costs are generally significant but short-lived, and sometimes do not operate through conventional channels. It is only the political consequences of a debt crisis which seem to be particularly dire for incumbent governments and finance ministers. In Pakistan’s case, the political costs are particularly high because of the continuing political stalemate between the military and the major political parties who have not succeeded in reaching a consensus on major political issues, including how to deal with the Taliban insurgency, Baluch nationalism and the rights of deprived sections of the population. If default is so important to the political class, especially the incumbents, it would behove them to pledge some of the prime properties and other assets owned by them in UK, Dubai and elsewhere, as a pledge against the amount due to avoid default.

 In many ways Pakistan’s debt trap is a mirror-image of what has been happening to the US economy in the past decade. Both economies have been driven by the stimulus of foreign inflows and large current account and budget deficits that have provided the growth momentum to their economies. At the end of the economic booms experienced during this period, both are finding themselves in grave difficulties, because the booms became unsustainable. Pakistan being a much more narrowly based and less highly leveraged economy was less susceptible to the financial crisis that the United States faced when the housing bubble burst a year ago. It was however much more vulnerable to the extraordinary rise in oil and food prices earlier in the year, hurting the poor much more severely. Another common characteristic of the growth pattern of the two economies was the high inequality that it give rise to in both countries. The entitlements of the poor, in terms of health, education and social services – albeit at very different levels – have been curtailed in both countries.

 For almost a decade, both economies have been defying some of the basic economic laws with impunity, largely due to fortuitous global and domestic factors that have enabled the more well-heeled sections of society to enjoy a level and pattern of living that is well beyond the collective resources of their economies. Both countries have one of the lowest savings rate in the world. While the United States has so far been bailed out by the rest of the world, especially China, East Asia and the oil-producing countries, who have invested their current account surpluses in US securities and assets, Pakistan has run out of reliable sources of foreign savings to complement their low domestic savings rate. The current shock to both economies may well pave the way for corrective action to pursue sustainable paths of development for them in future.

Those who had accepted the fait accompli of a rigged election, which the statements attributed to the President and the Attorney General on the eve of election had reinforced, have been surprised by the establishment’s inability to do so. 

 The surprising thing about the election was not the absence of overt rigging on the polling day (in contrast to the existence of pervasive pre-poll rigging), but that the rigging could not achieve the desired results. In places where the countervailing forces of high turn-out and sufficient vigilance by the opposition candidates and their agents, along with that of display of armed strength and presence of some conscientious officials, were not in evidence, rigging did achieve the desired results, especially in Karachi and Balochistan. 

 Thus the impression being created that the Musharraf establishment has held a free, fair and peaceful election, comparable to the 1970 election, is erroneous. The real credit for making these elections credible goes to the ordinary voter, who despite all the hurdles created in his (especially her) way gave a loud and clear message for the change of a regime which had amply demonstrated its indifference, insensitivity and ineptness in solving the growing problems accumulated over the past eight years. 

 By remaining in denial and perpetuating its tenure with the myth that there was no alternative and that the country was not ready for democracy, except for the praetorian kind, its popularity graph kept plunging to an extent that its narcissist instincts refused to recognise the real-life image painted by a politically alive media and civil society, as well as the pollsters. Its uncontrollable impulse to exercise power severely damaged all institutions, which were stuffed with military cronies and shorn of their autonomy and independence. It wreaked its vengeance on the lawyers and the judiciary, who were the first to challenge its authoritarianism and dared to call the uniformed emperor legally naked. 

 Preoccupied as it perennially remained with the task of clinging to power and obliging its charmed circle of beneficiaries, it forgot to give attention to the basic imperatives of good governance. Rolling in the largesse received from the US and its allies for its services in the war on terror and as a bonus for becoming ‘a major non-Nato ally’, the government indulged in irresponsible macroeconomic management by artificially promoting economic growth, without caring about its consequences for poverty and income inequality. 

 Its economic managers blindly followed their bosses in the political arena through misinformation and deliberate recourse to doctoring statistical data to create a false aura of prosperity, which boomeranged on them, much the same way the BJP’s shining India campaign did in the 2004 Indian elections. In the case of Pakistan, the reality of sharp hikes in the prices of flour, ‘ghee’, sugar and rice and other commodities of daily use exposed the hollowness of the Musharraf-Aziz-Elahi economic miracle. 

 It failed to invest sufficiently in public infrastructure, both physical and social, creating shortages and inflationary pressures on the supply of essential utilities and services. The regime’s legacy of a large fiscal and external deficit, heavy borrowing from the central bank, rising inflation, falling growth rate and rising poverty is a challenge that the succeeding economic managers will find difficult to deal with. 

 Despite its humiliating defeat, the Musharraf establishment is playing a rear-guard action to keep itself entrenched and to reverse the overwhelming verdict against its policies and protagonists, especially the retired General himself. A saner or more self-respecting man would have seen the writing on the wall a long time back and would have resigned honorably. 

 Even the most dyed-in-the-wool military stalwarts and his erstwhile seniors have advised him to give up the totally illegitimate path he has pursued since coming to power, but he has persisted in indulging in the worst kind of political brinkmanship, in the hope of deferring his day of reckoning which now stares him in the face. 

 Until now, he had been strongly supported by the United States in the belief that his services as its most important foot soldier in the war on terror were indispensable. However, although its position remains ambivalent, the US could soon decide to dispense with him. If it fails in this effort, the US could risk losing them both. 

 Musharraf’s unseemly reluctance to leave his office, which he is occupying without legitimacy, can only prolong the agony that the country has been experiencing for almost a year. If he continues to pursue the path of confrontation and tries to stage yet another coup (with the help of his legal magicians), he could well drag the country into a kind of strife seen in Kenya recently. 

 The country would heave a sigh of relief if and when he calls it a day. He still has time to redeem his record and be remembered as the country’s last military ruler and one who at the end of the day kept his promise of adhering to his motto of ‘Pakistan First’. 

 It is a matter of gratification that the three major parties of the country have at last decided to join hands on the road to democracy which has been paved with the flesh and blood of Benazir Bhutto and hundreds of those who laid down their lives in the past few months. Their agreement on major issues, including the restoration of the judiciary and the investigation of Benazir’s murder by the UN, should provide a foundation for forming a national government capable of clearing the wreckage of political cataclysm and social fissures left behind by the regime. 

 While the details of the agreements arrived at are yet to be worked out and there may yet be many a slip between the cup and lip, the nation can hope to turn a new leaf in its history. It may indeed be a blessing in disguise that the struggle for regaining the space for democracy and displacing a military regime has been so prolonged this time and has not come as a fortuitous result of an aerial disaster or a dramatic surrender to a foreign army, but through the combined efforts of political parties, the civil society and the awakening and awareness of common citizens. 

 While serious doubts remain about the ability of those elected not to repeat the colossal mistakes they made when they were in power before, the heightened public awareness and the restoration of their faith in the power to vote, should serve as a guarantee that they will at least minimise the egregious behaviour of the past.

 The so-called “heavy mandate” they received from the electorate ten weeks back is beginning to erode as the real problems of rising prices and falling incomes make the life of almost the majority of the population increasingly unbearable, as evidenced by the disturbing rise in suicide rates in the recent past. While the count-down on the judges’ restoration has already expired, the more important and politically significant deadline of 100 days for achieving a wide-ranging agenda of economic and social goals promised by the Prime Minister in his inaugural address to the Parliament, is also fast approaching. 

 A worrying aspect of the current situation is the increasing disconnect and dissonance between the political and economic elements of the coalition agenda and the assigned distribution of responsibilities among coalition partners. Ideally, both major partners in the coalition – the PPP and the PML(N) – should be jointly responsible for all aspects of their agenda. However, in practice there seems to be a broad division of responsibilities between the two.  

 While the Government is officially being run by the Prime Minister, with the coalition partners as members in the Cabinet, it seems the major political decisions are being made by one person, with the grudging acquiescence of another. Neither of the latter two are members of the Parliament, let alone the Cabinet. This rather novel system of back-seat driving is yet to prove its durability and usefulness. Supposedly fashioned on India’s Sonia Gandhi model, it is a much riskier enterprise. It not only lacks the institutional underpinning that accounts for the greater stability and smoothness of the Indian contrivance, it also does not have the fit of charisma and competence which Sonia Gandhi and Manmohan Singh epitomize.  

 At the operational level, the distribution of portfolios at the centre has been made in a way that key economic and social ministries, such as Finance, Commerce and Industry, Communications, Food and Agriculture, Petroleum and Natural Resources, Education and Science and Technology have been allocated to PML(N) nominees, while those considered to be “sensitive” and “security-oriented”, such as Defence, Interior, Foreign Affairs and Port and Shipping have been retained by the PPP – reportedly on the insistence of the US, which suspects PML(N) to be a less trustworthy ally. 

 As the coalition was crafted with the negative aim of pre-empting political space from the Musharraf-led Q-League rump, it failed to focus on more substantive issues which were necessary to consolidate the alliance. The Charter of Democracy, which is the magna carta of the present alliance, was restricted to constitutional and political reforms, did not envision a situation in which the two major allies will be working together to govern the country and failed to spell out the details of a Common Minimum Program which would appeal to  both their constituents. With the economic situation rapidly deteriorating and people desperately looking for  a credible way to get out of this morass, the two parties must put their heads together and focus on such a program. If the alliance is to succeed in providing the country a stable democratic system sensitive to the needs of the poor, rather than the elite groups and their foreign patrons. Unless the present declining trends in the economic and social conditions are reversed through the adoption of systematic policies and programs and the rebuilding of the institutions, the crisis of confidence between the rulers and the ruled is likely to aggravate, driving the latter  to extreme desperation.  There is no secret as to who will be the ultimate beneficiary of the resultant despondency and cynicism. 
  

The cumbersome political machine now in existence is also burdened with pro-active role of the presidency, based on primarily foreign and military interests that have been its guiding source since its present incumbent took over, pulling it in a contrary direction or putting brakes on its momentum. It is increasingly clear that the incumbent will resist being marginalized to the role of a Fazle Elahi or a Rafiq Tarrar or having his wings clipped for the rest of five years as a caged bird. Neither is he capable of playing the role of a neutral umpire, being more keen to act as a coach and  raise and train his favorite team. This would further complicate the running of an efficient parliamentary form of government, making it subject to the destabilizing influence of an unnecessary external force. The same argument could perhaps be used against an independent judiciary with suo moto powers, but that is a qualitatively different and constitutionally valid intervention, unlike that of a whimsical president who has an axe to grind. The judiciary’s interventions are, moreover, subject to appeal by a larger bench and have to be within the confines of the Constitution. 

 What Pakistani democracy needs most is not more experimentation but more studious attention to the basic principles of democracy, such as transparency, participation, debate and dialogue, both within parliament and within political parties and a wider engagement with civil society, including lawyers and other professional groups, the academia, think-tanks (which we don’t have enough of and those that exist don’t have either the quality or the autonomy to conduct innovative research), as well as the NGOs (especially those which are not mere off-shoots of foreign agendas).

The pervasiveness with which this project was implemented was unprecedented. Both the Ayub and Zia regimes, which lasted much longer than Musharraf’s, were far less prone to establishing such overarching hegemony. 

The civil-military face-off reached a climax with the dismissal of the Chief Justice in March 2007 on the basis of an untenable reference against him by the president, which sparked a lawyers-led struggle by civil society against the military regime and opened the possibility of democratic change. Despite the turn in the tide of domestic and international public opinion against him, General Musharraf succeeded in getting himself sworn in as president for a new five-year term. A series of Machiavellian moves beginning with the imposition of the emergency on November 3 by the COAS and ending in its lifting on December 15 by the president after his retirement from the army, with General Musharraf playing his favourite double role of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde, helped him achieve this bizarre feat. 

However, even before Benazir’s tragic death, which has all but sealed the fate of the Musharraf regime, two events — both tragic and unfortunate— served as the silver lining in the dark clouds that have pervaded since the regime came to power. The first event was the October 2005 earthquake which brought forth a groundswell of sympathy and material support from the people of Pakistan, and resulted in a relief and rescue effort in which the entire nation participated on a scale and with a commitment unparalleled in the country’s history. 

For a few months towards the end of 2005, Pakistan stood united and focused as never before, creating opportunities capable of transforming the country from a security-oriented state on the verge of being declared a failed state into a welfare state. But the military never yielded the commanding heights and turned the earthquake-affected areas into a large camp of refugees living on handouts. 

The second event that captured the imagination, hearts and minds of a significant and important section of Pakistani society, and raised hopes for its intellectual and moral emancipation, was Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry’s firm stance against his illegitimate suspension by General Musharraf in March 2007. Instead of meekly giving in to the president’s demand that he resign from his post or face a lengthy process of litigation and humiliation on trumped-up charges, the Chief Justice decided to challenge the legality of the reference against him and his suspension from office, which was itself unlawful. He refused to yield to the intimidation of the intelligence chiefs who were on hand when General Musharraf called him into his military camp office in Rawalpindi. 

The general, who had become accustomed to trampling the Constitution at will to suit his needs, seemed to have no idea of the disaster he was going to bring upon himself and the nation by this wanton act motivated by his desire to stay in power. If left unchallenged, it would have permanently damaged a basic edifice of the Constitution, viz. the independence of the judiciary. Pakistan’s superior judiciary, in its 60-year history epitomised by the ‘doctrine of necessity’, had seldom shown such courage before. 

Justice Chaudhry’s firm stance, despite the outrageous treatment meted out to him and his family during his trial, inspired the legal fraternity and civil society to rally behind him in almost daily and countrywide demonstrations with the chanting of ‘Go Musharraf, Go’ and other anti-government slogans. This gave the nine-member Supreme Court bench hearing Justice Chaudhry’s petition enough courage to quash the illegal reference and reinstate the Chief Justice. But for the determined efforts of the lawyers, led by Aitzaz Ahsan, both inside and outside the court, it would not have been possible to achieve this near miracle. 

Since November 3, with the imposition of the emergency, the country was in a state of suspended animation, notwithstanding the formal lifting of the emergency on December 15. With the independent electronic media banished or put under tight control, the non-PCO judiciary deposed, the political parties half-heartedly participating in elections, Musharraf could hardly have wished for more. He and his minions had felt comfortable enough to rig the elections and install a parliament whose composition would ensure their continued hegemony for the next five years. It would, in due course, have received the imprimatur of his patrons abroad, ensuring the continued flow of the foreign aid which has been the regime’s lifeline. 

However, the forces unleashed by the lawyers’ successful struggle to have the Chief Justice reinstated began gathering momentum and thwarted the possibility of this bleak scenario becoming a reality. The lawyers were joined by a broad section of civil society, including the media, educationists, students, civil rights and development and women’s activists, as well as common citizens. Although the numbers of the latter were small, they were bound to grow by leaps and bounds once people become convinced of the correctness of the cause of uprightness, fairness and defiance of unlawful authority which Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry and his colleagues have come to symbolise. 

A few years ago, a poor peasant woman from southern Punjab, Mukhtaran Mai, had shown similar courage to defy her feudal lords who had made her a victim of gang rape, inspiring the nation by raising her voice against tyranny.These values, to which Benazir’s killing has added reduced fear of death and personal harm, had till now faced the danger of becoming extinct, while hypocrisy, cowardice and lack of integrity were fast becoming the operational norms of society. The March 9 dismissal of the Chief Justice proved a blessing in disguise for the besieged nation. Similarly the December 27 killing of Benazir, which has completely changed the political landscape, may well pave the way for roads not taken and the realisation of dreams which had been turned into nightmares. 

The civilian-military confrontation has now reached a new peak with the controversy over Benazir’s assassination and the likelihood of Musharraf’s political supporters being swept out in the coming elections. This has put the regime doubly on the defensive. The general and his legal team have already used up every weapon in their arsenal to contain the public wrath against their diversionary tactics and every red herring to justify their illegal acts. Should the election results fail to follow the intended script, the regime would certainly not be averse to undertaking some more desperate unconstitutional acts to keep itself in the saddle. 

But its game is up and the dismissal of the Chief Justice and Benazir’s assassination provide the final acts of the macabre drama staged during the Musharraf era. Its requiem will go largely unsung while the whole nation mourns the death of Benazir Bhutto.

The “heavy mandate” the coalition  received from the electorate ten weeks back is beginning to erode as the real problems of rising prices and falling incomes make the life of almost the majority of the population increasingly unbearable, as evidenced by the disturbing rise in suicide rates in the recent past. While the count-down on the judges’ restoration has become irrelevant, the more important and politically significant deadline of 100 days for achieving a wide-ranging agenda of economic and social goals promised by the Prime Minister in his inaugural address to the Parliament, is fast approaching. If significant progress is not made in that direction, the coalition could encounter a strong popular backlash of despondency and cynicism, which could only benefit its enemies. 

A worrying aspect of the current situation is the increasing disconnect and dissonance between the political and economic elements of the coalition agenda and the assigned distribution of responsibilities among coalition partners. Ideally, both major partners in the coalition – the PPP and the PML(N) – should be jointly responsible for all aspects of their agenda. However, in practice there seems to be a broad division of responsibilities between the two.  

While the Government is officially being run by the Prime Minister, with the coalition partners as members in the Cabinet, it seems the major political decisions are being made by one person, with the grudging acquiescence of another. Neither of the latter two are members of the Parliament, let alone the Cabinet. This rather novel system of back-seat driving is yet to prove its durability and usefulness. Supposedly fashioned on India’s Sonia Gandhi model, it is a contraption which could easily come apart. It not only lacks the institutional underpinning that accounts for the greater stability, resilience and smoothness of the Indian contrivance, it also does not have the fit of charisma and competence which Sonia Gandhi and Manmohan Singh epitomize.  

At the operational level, the distribution of portfolios at the centre has been made in a way that key economic and social ministries, such as Finance, Commerce and Industry, Communications, Food and Agriculture, Petroleum and Natural Resources, Education and Science and Technology have been allocated to PML(N) nominees, while those considered to be “sensitive” and “security-oriented”, such as Defence, Interior, Foreign Affairs and Port and Shipping have been retained by the PPP – reportedly on the insistence of the US, which suspects PML(N) to be a less trustworthy ally. 

As the coalition was crafted with the negative aim of pre-empting political space from the Musharraf-led Q-League rump, it failed to focus on more substantive issues which were necessary to consolidate the alliance. The Charter of Democracy  was restricted to constitutional and political reforms, did not envision a situation in which the two major allies will be working together to govern the country. It failed to spell out the details of a Common Minimum Program which would appeal to  both their constituents. With the economic situation rapidly deteriorating and people desperately looking for  a credible way to get out of this morass, the two parties must put their heads together and focus on such a program. If the alliance is to succeed in providing the country a stable democratic system sensitive to the needs of the poor, rather than the elite groups and their foreign patrons, it will need the glue of a populist, yet pragmatic, socio-economic renaissance. 

The cumbersome political machine now in existence is also burdened with pro-active role of the presidency, based on primarily foreign and military interests that have been its guiding source since its present incumbent took over, pulling it in a contrary direction or putting brakes on its momentum. It is increasingly clear that the incumbent will resist being marginalized to the role of a Fazle Elahi or a Rafiq Tarrar or having his wings clipped, reconciling to live as a caged bird. Neither is he capable of playing the role of a neutral umpire, being more prone to act as a coach who  raises and trains his favorite team.  

The coalition is on the horns of a dilemma whether to remove what most consider to be the greatest stumbling block in its way or to concentrate on the more substantive issues from which the latter distracts attention. The judges’ issue has taken far too much time and energy of the coalition through second guessing the presidency’s intentions. It may be well worthwhile to call the latter’s bluff and face the consequences, rather than being paralysed by its fear; the worst fear may be the fear itself. 

What Pakistani democracy needs most is not more experimentation but more studious attention to the basic principles of democracy, such as transparency, participation, debate and dialogue, both within parliament and within political parties and a wider engagement with civil society, including lawyers and other professional groups, the academia, think-tanks (which we don’t have enough of and those that exist don’t have either the quality or the autonomy to conduct innovative research), as well as the NGOs (especially those which are not mere off-shoots of foreign agendas). The road to democracy needs to be paved more solidly than by good intentions alone.

 People had pinned lot of hopes on this year’s Independence Day, as the scourge of militancy, accompanied by suicide bombs and terrorization of innocent civilians, seem to have abated  and that some semblance of civility among the major political parties, as well as the civil society had been achieved. At least some in the Malakand and Swat division had the pleasure of returning to their destroyed homes and shops and unfurl the Pakistan flags on them, without the fear of being torn apart by the Talibans. But the continuing miseries of the common man – from load-shedding and sugar shortage to the affordable and accessible availability of educational, health, housing and transport facilities – exacerbated by increasing unemployment and inflation, remained as distant from solution as the earth from the moon, with time-tables much vaguer, less precise and credible than those of some of our neighbors’ plans to land a vehicle on the moon.

 Now all eyes are on our rulers’ old and volatile friend, the US, whose new emissary, Mr Holbrooke, has now included the solution of our load-shedding and other economic issues in his agenda of war on terrorism. Who knows his next target of reform may be tackling Karachi’s land mafia. Perhaps, his refurbished chancery will soon provide him a parallel secretariat in Islamabad to micromanage and implement his ever-expanding agenda.

 Manna from heaven – in the form of foreign aid — always salivates our rulers’ appetites and makes them act more obsequiously towards their benefactors, even though it is never costless to the people who ultimately have to bear its burden in terms of debt-servicing, inflation and increased taxes. Yet, if there is one thing our ruling elites are united about, it is the clamour for more (and more) foreign aid. For one thing, it saves them the need for articulating a plan based on our own resources and knowledge, instead of serving pre-packaged economic recipes imported from abroad, with local seasonings of Shan Masala added to give them a “home-cooked” flavour.

 Most of our ongoing crises can be solved without massive assistance from outside, which often creates more problems than it solves and provides opportunities for rent-seeking that benefit  a small group of privileged insiders and their proteges. This is well illustrated by the way the Government has handled some of the ongoing economic crises, which are in most cases  the result of dithering and delayed action leading to artificial scarcities – often created by neglect, if not premeditated design.

Take for instance, the energy crisis. It seems to have arisen not so much because there was a large imbalance between domestic supply and demand, but because of liquidity constraints faced by producers. In the wake of rising oil prices last year, the net revenue receipts (restrained by regulated electricity tariffs) of public and private producers (mainly, WAPDA and KESC and IPPs), fell short of the cost of power generation, resulting in the inability of the latter to purchase fuel oil in sufficient amounts to sustain capacity utilization of power plants. The Government’s payments of subsidies to the producers could not be financed because of the IMF standby agreement, which prohibits such payments.

Thus a monetary or fiscal constraint was transformed into a real economy problem, with adverse effects on production, employment and welfare. While expansion in electricity generation was necessary in the long-term, the emergence of the “circular debt” problem created opportunities for rent-seekers to establish rental power plants (RPPs) at exorbitant costs, which will ultimately the consumers will bear.

 This pattern of autistic policy mismanagement, leading to artificial scarcities and then the attempt to belatedly solve them through expensive measures to enhance capacity or increase imports – with a view to benefiting favored lobbies – is  also evident in the case of atta and sugar scarcities. Ultimately, the Government caves in to the pressure groups, yielding them windfall rents and breaking the already arching back of the common man.

 The politicians and other actors charged with underwriting the nations fortunes continue to play their games and trading the blames with each other, rather than taking concrete steps to solve the very grave crisis of living the poor are faced with today. The lumping together of these problems as the “crisis of governance” is  misleading and fails to illuminate the structural problems that underlie them.

 The willful denigration of the state as a parasitic, if not an exploitative, organization by neo-classical economists has lent credence to the need for scaling down its reach and power. However, increasingly –  especially in the context of the ongoing global economic crisis –  the role of the state in pursuing welfare-enhancing policies is being recognized. In Pakistan, the state has been so emaciated through both infighting among politicians and as a consequence of the servile deference to donor’s preferences that it is unable to deliver the most basic amenities to its citizens, such as education, health and housing. The anticipated large inflow of funds that the Government is hoping under the Kerry-Lugar bill and FODP meetings are unlikely to improve the situation.

 The only sphere in which the Pakistani state  has covered itself with “glory” is in the exercise of coercion to put down nationalist upsurges in minority provinces, in the name of fighting terrorism and insurgencies. This has had the most horrific effect on the situation in Balochistan, which informal reports of visiting non-Baluchis describe as being perilously close to the pre-March 1971 situation in former East Pakistan.  If the state’s wings need to be clipped anywhere, it is in the exercise of such coercive power.

Even eternal optimists can see light only at the very far end of the tunnel and even they are sceptical whether it will necessarily be a harbinger of good tidings. 

An overwhelming sense of despondency, disillusionment and cynicism pervades the present political environment. Yesterday’s self-sacrificing heroes are today’s self-seeking predators who prey not only on their enemies but also turn on their own like cannibals and have little regard for the interests of those who brought them to power. It is becoming difficult to distinguish between a friend and a foe and the reputations of esteemed icons of patriotism and valour are being ground into the dust. No holds seem to be barred in this game of power. 

All this is most perplexing to the common people who tend to regard their heroes, rightly or wrongly, as the epitome of virtue and as representatives of their aspirations. While these power games continue to be played among the elites in faraway lands and in elegant drawing rooms and posh hotels, ordinary people — in whose name these games are played — continue to chafe under increasing misery and exploitation. Every day a new diversion — a new squabble with a neighbouring country, a new wrinkle in the war on terror, a new version of how we made the bomb and traded our secrets for the aggrandisement of a few and the insecurity of many — contributes to a new way of avoiding swift and decisive action on the key issues that are preventing the country from moving in the right direction. Then there is the fear of a new financial disaster hitting the economy, a new deal on getting rid of the president without hurting him or his cronies and continuing policies that bring solace to mentors and distress to the people, or a new way to restore the judiciary. 

The nation awaits the time when a new leaf will be turned and hatchets are buried with the assurance that those guilty of past disasters will not be let off the hook. The new regime, a strange conflation of past and present politicians and bureaucrats, is busy finding excuses to justify the status quo as something the nation has to learn to live with — for ever. Déjà vu is the overarching national sentiment and seemingly fated destiny. 

When and how this circle will ever be broken is a puzzle that everyone is grappling with on a daily basis. Besides knee-jerk cynicism vis-à-vis politics, people are finding other escape routes such as religious bigotry and drug addiction. And then there is ultimate escape: migration to foreign lands, opportunities for which are by no means plentiful or affordable for the majority of the population. 

Many are now pinning their hopes on an economic turnaround that would pull the country out of its present morass and somehow pave the way for the political renaissance it badly needs. This seems to be an unlikely possibility though given the current global economic turmoil. 

Indeed what is far more likely — and which two of our more promising and savvy economists, Ijaz Nabi and Haris Gazdar, have warned against in these columns — is that our global mentors, the IMF and the World Bank, will soon be knocking at our doors with their old patented medicines. Their stabilisation and structural adjustment packages have aggravated rather than cured our economy’s chronic ailments and are even less likely to be effective in the present conditions. 

The country’s political elites are unlikely to say no to these seemingly friendly but potentially harmful offers and the largesse that accompanies them. Such an offer would certainly be tempting. For one thing, it would ease the acute financial constraints that are inhibiting the exercise of political power. 

At the same time, it would help avoid the challenges of undertaking more fundamental structural makeovers, such as increasing resource mobilisation and enhancing domestic savings rates, which have remained abysmally low. 

It is doubtful — as suggested by Ijaz Nabi and endorsed by Haris Gazdar — if the mere substitution of aid from the West (channelled through the IMF and the World Bank) by that from our oil-rich ‘friends’ who have been as complicit in setting the direction of our polity as the former would help matters greatly. 

It needs to be recognised, as Haris Gazdar implicitly does, that a nexus between the two most affluent economic groups in the world is causing the worldwide inflation and financial crisis which most developing countries, especially those with weak political structures, are unable to cope with. 

Regardless of the political business cycle whose periodic regularity has come to be accepted as inevitable, the basic problem facing the country is its failure to date to evolve a resilient economic and political system which would be responsive to the needs of the impoverished and deprived sections of its population and would be immune to the manipulation and control of its ruthless elites. The Feb 18 elections had provided a glimmer of hope that this may be within the realm of possibility within a decade or so. 

But the present stalemate —  for which no plausible explanations are forthcoming — has all but extinguished it. If the political cycle is cut short by another military misadventure, Pakistan’s survival as a nation state would be jeopardised for ever. The dream of its emergence as a bridge between Central and South Asia, much less of its becoming an Asian tiger, will also be consigned to history. 

The political and economic destiny of the country are inalienably linked and to think that we can have an efficient and equitable economy with a dysfunctional political system is a delusion. Any attempt to de-link the two is unlikely to serve Pakistan well at this juncture.

The nation heaved a sigh of relief on the morning of 16 March for having avoided a disastrous confrontation between the Government and the lawyers-led Long March. Until a day before the scheduled dharna had to begin in Islamabad it seemed clear that the Government was hell-bent on stopping the Long March to Islamabad at all costs. Its unprecedented efforts to seal all roads leading to the capital from different parts of the country and to put it under siege was a replication, albeit on a much larger scale, of what the MQM and its allies were able to achieve in Karachi on 12 May 2007. Thankfully, there was no comparable loss of lives or property on this occasion.

The hysteria created by the vitriolic Adviser for the Interior, Mr. Rehman Malik, who did not fail to make the  slanderous charge against the principal architect of the lawyers’ movement for his betrayal of Benazir Bhutto, just a day before the dharna, made one feel that Pakistan was under nuclear attack. The  overconfidence oozed by his partner-in-crime, the Governor of Punjab, the billionaire member of a distinguished family of radical poets, writers and artists,  was such that one would have believed that not more than a few hundred would be able to make it to the Constitution Avenue in Islamabad. It was also pathetic to see some of the leading members of the PPP trying to defend the actions of Mr. Zardari in reneging on his agreement to restore the judges, with one of them going to the extent of saying that Mr. Zardari was “trapped” into putting his signature while trying to depose President Musharraf.

The whole nation was apprehensive that the midnight of the 15^th and 16^th March would bring  the news of a horrific end to the procession led by Mr. Nawaz Sharif from Lahore to Islamabad, especially after Mr. Malik advised the latter of the possibility of a suicide attack on it. One recalled the fate of Benazir’s procession in October 2007 at Karsaz on her way from the airport to Quaid’s mazar in Karachi. It raised even more concern when before midnight one of the networks reported that although Mr. Sharif’s procession had been able to break the barriers to cross the Ravi bridge, the authorities had planned a much more forceful interception, led by a senior DIG Police and armed with hundreds of tear gas bombs, near Kala Shah Kaku. But it seems that by that time the accompanying crowd had swelled to such an extent that the police with all its might was incapable of holding it back and the Army was unwilling to step in.

In an ironic and serendipitous twist, Mr. Nawaz Sharif not only followed Benazir in ignoring the official warning, but also in taking courage in his hands to delude and defy the heavy posse of police that had encircled his Raiwind and Model Town residences. It were, as if – to rephrase his own observation about Mr. Zardari’s metamorphosis – the Benazir spirit had possessed Mr. Sharif. The rest became instant history. Mr. Sharif came close to succeeding – and may eventually do so, if necessary – in fulfilling Ms. Bhutto’s dream of launching an Orange revolution in Pakistan. The largest single contribution of the Long March may have been to demonstrate the possibility of people power in the country, whose likely emergence had been disputed by many political analysts in the past.

Prime Minister Gilani, aided by the COAS and the frantic calls from Washington and London, was losing the race against time in putting together a credible declaration that would prevent the steel-container  dykes built by Mr. Malik around the capital’s periphery and within its center from being breached by the human flood that was ready to break loose after dawn. There was no doubt that his announcement was based on the consent made by Mr. Zardari almost under duress; the alibi of Mr. Dogar’s retirement used for delaying the implementation of the Bourban declaration by over a year was a facile afterthought, intended to avoid a loss of face.

Nevertheless, both the lawyers and the representatives of political parties seem to have accepted it without detailed scrutiny as they too could not hold the fort much longer and were eager to prove their spirit of reconciliation, as well as due to the growing restiveness of those for whom political rhetoric is no substitute for daily bread. It can only be hoped that this agreement will be more enduring and trust-enhancing than the previous ones and would not require another prolonged dharna to enforce it. The inordinate delay in issuing the formal notification for well over 24 hours after the momentous declaration created ominous misgivings.

There  have been victory celebrations all over the country and people are rejoicing at having something at last to cheer about. There is considerable  elation in the public about the role of civil society, the media and common people in achieving the goal of an independent judiciary. However, it is far from clear that the groundwork for the democratic process to function smoothly has been laid or that the country has turned the corner in its political development. Despite the lawyers’ rhetoric, the country needs much more radical changes than the restoration of over a dozen suspended judges to confront the many complex political and economic challenges it is faced with.

If Pakistan wants to cease being the laughing stock of the world and remove itself from the short-list of failing and dysfunctional states, it will have to reinvent its polity and radically reform its economic and social structure in an environment of peace and political stability. The two major coalition partners, as well as the regional allies, will have to come to a political consensus, within the framework of the Constitution and the Charter of Democracy, that would obviate the necessity of frequent extraneous intervention by the Army or the external powers. The political parties must endeavour to compete among themselves by outperforming each other in the various tasks of national development in various fields, rather than through the destructive politics of creating ‘forward blocs’ in each other’s ranks by rewarding the bad cops and sidelining the good ones in their parties.

The Long March will inevitably have its impact on the complexion of Pakistani politics. There is a perception that  the stature of Mr. Nawaz Sharif and his party will rise and, correspondingly, that Mr. Zardari’s and the PPP’s will fall. This is also attributable to the former’s consistency and openness and the latter’s unpredictability and reliance on a closed group which has excluded old party faithfuls and has inducted those with dubious credentials. However, this should not tempt Mr. Sharif to seek mid-term elections and underestimate the PPP’s much wider and deeper grassroots base, which could well realign itself to show its resilience. Likewise, Mr. Zardari needs to restrain himself from overplaying his hand based on the immense political power he has recently amassed. Thankfully, Pakistani people are climbing the learning curve of democracy at a fast pace and are now capable of dislodging anyone who disregards their real interests, which should serve to deter any more misadventures.